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WHAT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT  
CAN LEARN FROM  
THE SUPREME COURT—AND VICE VERSA* 
ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS** 
 
Thank you, Dean Farley, Don Dunner, and the Finnegan firm.   
I would especially like to thank Michael Carroll for inviting me to 
deliver this Lecture.  It is a real privilege to have been asked, and a 
pleasure to be here.  I would also like to thank him for suggesting 
that I talk about one of my favorite topics.  I have been a student of 
the Federal Circuit for some time.  The statute enacting the court was 
passed while I was clerking in the Second Circuit for Judge Feinberg, 
and I have to tell you, the smile on his face when he discovered he 
would never have to hear another patent case was a beauty to behold. 
Also, while I was a law clerk to Chief Justice Burger at the Supreme 
Court, the hard work of getting the court organized was taking place.  
Justice Burger took a special interest in judicial administration,  
so during that period, he spent time with Howard Markey.  Markey 
had been the Chief Judge of the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals, and he was slated to become the First Circuit’s first Chief.  
The two of them decided that since I had been a chemist before I 
                                                          
 * The Fifth Annual Finnegan Distinguished Lecture on Intellectual Property, 
presented on Oct. 16, 2009, was hosted by the Finnegan law firm, the American 
University Washington College of Law (WCL), and the Program on Information Justice 
and Intellectual Property (PIJIP).  Introductory remarks from Christine Farley, 
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at WCL, from Don Dunner, Partner at the 
Finnegan firm, and from Michael Carroll, Professor of Law at WCL, have been 
omitted.  This Lecture has been edited. 
 ** Pauline Newman Professor of Law and co-Director of the Engelberg Center 
on Innovation Law and Policy, New York University School of Law. 
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went to law school, and because I was interested in patent law,  
I should be Markey’s inaugural Federal Circuit law clerk.  It would 
have been a lot of fun, but unfortunately my life—my husband and 
children—were moving back to New York.  So I had to decline, and I 
started to teach at NYU Law School instead.  Nonetheless, I remained 
curious about how the court was faring.  And at its fifth anniversary, 
which was right before I was to get tenure, I decided to write my 
“tenure piece” on its jurisprudence.1  Since then, I have revisited the 
question of the court periodically. 
To a student of patents, civil procedure, and legal institutions, the 
Federal Circuit is a superb subject for academic inquiry because it was 
actually created as an experiment; there are not too many 
experiments in law, so this one was pretty special.  What happened is 
this:  in the early 1970s, federal appellate dockets had increased to 
the point where the regional circuits could no longer handle the 
load.  The first impulse was to add new judges to existing circuits.  
But that would have been of limited help because increasing the 
number of judges would lead to more intra-circuit inconsistency and 
would breed more cases for the circuit courts to decide.  Adding new 
circuits was also a possibility, but such an addition would also have 
been problematic because more circuits would mean new 
opportunities for inter-circuit splits, and that would breed more cases 
for the Supreme Court to decide. 
The Hruska Commission was convened to study the issue, and in 
1973, it conceived the idea of experimenting with specialization—
with pulling a class or classes of appeals out of the regional system 
and funneling them into a special appellate tribunal.2  The new court 
would reduce the dockets of the regional circuits, and it could,  
in theory, do much more.  Its presence could also diminish 
opportunities for forum shopping and take pressure off the Supreme 
Court.  If it were small enough to speak with a single voice, it could 
bring more coherence to the law it administered.  And, with greater 
expertise in the field, it might decide cases more efficiently.  As Judge 
Markey told Congress, “[I]f I am doing brain surgery every day, day in 
and day out, chances are very good that I will do your brain surgery 
much quicker . . . than someone who does brain surgery once every 
                                                          
 1. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit:  A Case Study in Specialized 
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
 2. See Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure and 
Internal Procedures:  Recommendations for Change (1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195 
(setting forth the final recommendations of the Hruska Commission). 
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couple of years.”3  Although the Hruska Commission report actually 
made several suggestions for fields that would be appropriate for 
specialization, patent law was, if you will, “the killer app.” 
Way back in 1911, Learned Hand was called upon to decide 
whether purified adrenaline was patentable subject matter.4  It was a 
significant issue then, and the case retains its importance now, 
because its holding is thought to support patenting in the biotech 
sector.  Significantly, in his rather brilliant opinion, Judge Hand 
nevertheless ended as follows: 
I cannot stop without calling attention to the extraordinary 
condition of the law which makes it possible for a man without any 
knowledge of even the rudiments of chemistry to pass upon such 
questions as these. . . . How long we shall continue to blunder 
along . . . no one knows; but all fair persons not conventionalized 
by provincial legal habits of mind ought, I should think, unite to 
effect some such advance.5 
Congress decided, in light of the Hruska Commission Report, that 
seventy-one years of blundering was enough.  The “advance”—the 
Federal Circuit—would, in one fell swoop, solve the problems the 
Commission was formed to address, answer Learned Hand’s plea for 
technologically expert judging in patent cases, and bring that smile to 
Judge Feinberg’s face. 
But it is important to remember that this was an experiment, and it 
was risky.  Specialization had been tried in the past and, for the most 
part, failed.  The poster child was the Commerce Court, which was 
created in 1910 to review decisions of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission.  The court was so hated—by the railroads, by shippers, 
by the public—that it was disbanded within three years of its 
founding (and one of its five judges was also impeached, but that may 
be a different story).6 
In fact, there were many reasons to be concerned about 
specialization.  Isolating patent law could favor special interests.  
Appointments to regional courts—that is, to generalist courts—are so 
                                                          
 3. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:  Hearings on H.R. 2405 Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
97th Cong. 42–43 (1981) (statement of the Honorable Howard T. Markey, C.J., 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals).  See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,  
The Federal Circuit:  A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
769 (2004) (tracing the development of the Federal Circuit); Dreyfuss, supra note 1 
(same). 
 4. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911),  
rev’d on other grounds, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912). 
 5. Id. at 115. 
 6. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 
391–93 (1990). 
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highly contested by so many special interest groups that they dilute 
each other’s effectiveness.  But when there is only one field to fight 
about, those who are better organized and have the most money—
which, in this context, is probably patent holders—can “capture” the 
appointments process so that judges are predisposed to their 
interests.  Even without capture, patent holders would, it was thought, 
have an advantage.  As repeat players, they could manipulate the way 
that important issues were framed for litigation. 
There were also fears that the judges might develop tunnel vision.  
The saying is, if you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail.   
In an effort to support innovation, the judges might be so focused on 
patents, they would ignore non-patent incentives to innovate, such as 
intellectual curiosity, the availability of prizes, or competition.  
Furthermore, people were worried about the Federal Circuit’s 
isolation.  They were concerned that the court’s exclusive jurisdiction 
would take patent law out of the judicial mainstream and deprive the 
law of the benefits of cross-fertilization.7  Finally, the bar was worried 
that there would be difficult boundary problems on the allocation of 
cases among the appellate courts. 
Congress took these concerns seriously.  While the Federal Circuit 
was given authority over all, or, as we will see, nearly all patent 
appeals, it is not specialized in the traditional sense because there are 
many other sources of its judicial authority.  These include such areas 
as diverse as contracts, torts, export controls, labor law, and energy 
issues.8  Other industries and bar groups are therefore involved in 
lobbying for appointments, and the judges must stay abreast of  
non-patent legal developments. 
Indeed, from most perspectives, the Hruska Commission’s 
experiment has been a raging success.9  The court has now passed the 
quarter-century mark.  The patent industries and the patent bar are 
delighted with it, and—in what might be the biggest compliment  
of all—many other countries are copying it.10  On the whole, the 
concerns people expressed about specialization have not eventuated.  
There has been no capture of the appointment process.  If anything, 
there is concern that not enough appointees have had patent 
                                                          
 7. See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001  
U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 396–97 (2001). 
 8. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006). 
 9. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity:  The Federal Circuit 
Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 788–89 (2008). 
 10. An example is the intellectual property court recently established in Taiwan.  
See Nicole M. Lin, IP Court Releases First Year Performance, TAI E QUARTERLY,  
Nov. 2009, at 1–2, available at http://www.taie.com.tw/English/pdf/01305.pdf. 
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experience.  Nor have repeat players distorted the law, and for good 
reason.  People in the research and development business are both 
producers and users of technology.  They do not want overly 
protective law for the cases where they are accused of infringing, and 
they do not want overly permissive law for the cases where they are 
the right holders.  To be sure, there were some boundary problems, 
but the Supreme Court’s early interventions largely cleared them up.  
In United States v. Hohri,11 the Court made it clear that, unlike the 
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals (TECA)—another failed 
experiment in specialization12—the Federal Circuit had “case” rather 
than “issue” jurisdiction:  once a case is properly before the Federal 
Circuit, it decides all of the issues, not just the patent ones.13  At the 
same time, in Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.14 and Holmes 
Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,15 the Supreme Court 
withheld Federal Circuit jurisdiction when the patent issues in a case 
appear only in the defense or in a counterclaim.16  These decisions 
have the benefit of giving the court a somewhat broader perspective 
on innovation policy, while also creating an interchange with other 
national courts. 
Most important, however, the Federal Circuit’s success can be 
attributed to the many positive contributions it has made to patent 
law.  Most obviously, for patent appeals, the Federal Circuit is almost 
the only game in town.  As a result, it has eliminated forum shopping 
and has attained a high degree of national uniformity, and that is a 
value that the industry positively cherishes.  No one will make heavy 
commitments of time or money if there is uncertainty about what law 
is going to apply.  There are some exceptions here, including, as 
Kimberly Moore has shown, some forum shopping at the district 
court level.17  But the situation has vastly improved. 
The Federal Circuit has also made a key procedural innovation.   
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,18 the court, with the Supreme 
Court’s approval, eliminated jury trials on claim construction.19  That 
                                                          
 11. 482 U.S. 64 (1987). 
 12. See Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 396–99. 
 13. Hohri, 482 U.S. at 74–76. 
 14. 486 U.S. 800, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109 (1988). 
 15. 535 U.S. 826, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2002). 
 16. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 830–31, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803–04; Christianson, 
486 U.S. at 809, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1113. 
 17. See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases:  Does Geographic Choice 
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 892 (2001). 
 18. 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996). 
 19. Id. at 390, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471 (“We accordingly think there is 
sufficient reason to treat construction of terms of art like many other responsibilities 
that we cede to a judge in the normal course of trial . . . .”). 
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ruling created more predictability in the interpretation of patent 
claims, yet another value that the industry holds in high esteem.   
To be sure, there are still complaints about the continuing 
indeterminacy of claim construction, but in an empirical study, 
Jeffrey Lefstin demonstrated that the level of uncertainty in this area 
specifically is no different than that for contract interpretation 
generally.20  Indeed, in another empirical work, Lefstin  showed much 
more:  that the Federal Circuit’s developed expertise in patent law 
has made the law more predictable across a whole range of issues, 
including infringement, validity, and inequitable conduct.21  And 
according to Robert Gomulkiewicz, the court has also become highly 
knowledgeable about the technology business.22  Because the court 
sees so many cases about patent transactions, it is now an influential 
voice within the federal judiciary as a whole on questions involving 
licensing. 
Given the happiness within the bar and within the patent 
industries, and given the eagerness of other countries to copy the 
Hruska Commission’s experiment, it is perhaps a surprise that lately 
the Supreme Court has changed its practice.  In the first twenty or so 
years, its review of the Federal Circuit was largely intermittent and 
confined to procedural issues—cases like Hohri, Christianson, Holmes, 
and Markman.  However, the Court has recently begun to intervene 
regularly; it has begun to address the substance of patent law;  
and it has reversed, vacated, or questioned nearly every decision:  
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., on standing to challenge a patent;23 
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., on nonobviousness 
(inventiveness);24 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., on 
the doctrine of equivalents;25 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 
on the statutory research exemption;26 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG 
Electronics, Inc., on patent exhaustion;27 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
                                                          
 20. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpretive 
Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1065 (2007). 
 21. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt:  Dissent, Indeterminacy, and 
Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1072 (2007). 
 22. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s Licensing Law Jurisprudence:   
Its Nature and Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199, 202 (2009). 
 23. 549 U.S. 118, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (2007), rev’g 427 F.3d 958,  
76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1914 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 24. 550 U.S. 398, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (2007), rev’g 119 Fed. App’x 282 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 25. 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002), vacating 234 F.3d 558,  
56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 26. 545 U.S. 193, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2005), vacating 331 F.3d 860,  
66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 27. 128 S. Ct. 2109, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (2008), rev’g 453 F.3d 1364,  
79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1443 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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L.L.C., on injunctive relief;28 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, 
Inc., on whether patents imply market power;29 and Microsoft Corp. v. 
AT&T Corp., on the extraterritorial application of U.S. law.30  
Admittedly, the Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-bred International, on what constitutes 
patentable subject matter.31  However, in Laboratory Corp. of America 
Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.,32 on a dissent from the dismissal 
of certiorari, Justice Breyer cast doubt on the Federal Circuit’s subject 
matter jurisprudence.33  And there is yet another subject matter case 
pending in the Supreme Court—Bilski v. Kappos34—where there are 
similar doubts about the Federal Circuit’s rule. 
Significantly, we are in an era in which Supreme Court review is 
otherwise declining.  Furthermore, heightened review of patent cases 
is happening in the absence of the circuit splits that usually attract 
Supreme Court attention.  Accordingly, one really must wonder 
about this level of activity and whether it is an implicit criticism of the 
Federal Circuit’s work. 
I, however, am going to argue tonight that heightened review 
should not be taken as a criticism of the Federal Circuit.  The 
Supreme Court’s interest in patent law is at worst neutral:  every 
circuit comes into focus periodically, and now that the Federal 
Circuit has come of age, it is taking its turn.  More to the point, 
Supreme Court involvement in Federal Circuit decisions should be 
regarded as highly salutary, for these two tribunals have a great deal 
to learn from one another. 
What I mean is this.  The Federal Circuit must, obviously, learn 
from the Supreme Court, for it is bound by the Supreme Court’s 
decisions.  But the relationship between these two courts is not simply 
                                                          
 28. 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (2006), vacating 401 F.3d 1323,  
74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 29. 547 U.S. 28, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2006), vacating 396 F.3d 1342,  
73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 30. 550 U.S. 437, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400 (2007), rev’g 414 F.3d 1366,  
75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1506 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 31. 534 U.S. 124, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (2001), aff’g 200 F.3d 1374,  
53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1440  (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 32. 548 U.S. 124, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (2006) (per curiam), denying cert. to 
370 F.3d 1354, 370 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 33. See id. at 132–34, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068–69 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the Federal Circuit’s holding in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature 
Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998), 
abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008),  
is inconsistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence on patentable subject matter). 
 34. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008)  
(en banc), cert. granted sub nom., Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), and argued sub 
nom., Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. argued Nov. 9, 2009). 
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a matter of judicial hierarchy.  They have a great deal in common.  
Both of these courts are caught in the Hruska Commission’s 
experiment; they must both figure out how a judiciary largely 
committed to generalist adjudication should deal with a court that is 
so differently constituted.  And both courts are, in a sense, courts of 
last resort (at least, the Federal Circuit is when the Supreme Court is 
not so focused on its activities).  In that capacity, both have weighty 
responsibilities regarding the substance of national law and for 
supervising the courts below them.  Of course, they see these 
problems from different perspectives.  Sharing their views—learning 
from one another—could enhance the operation of the patent 
system, shed light on the costs and benefits of specialization, ease the 
path for other specialized courts, and improve judicial administration 
more generally. 
Let me start with the first area of specialization, where there are 
two distinct problems:  the Federal Circuit’s relationship to the 
generalist Supreme Court, which reviews its work, and its relationship 
to the generalist trial courts, whose work it reviews.  I will describe 
both problems and then discuss the lessons to be learned. 
Of these, the harder question is the Federal Circuit’s relationship 
to the Supreme Court.  Obviously, the Federal Circuit is subject to 
Supreme Court review—the same as the other circuit courts—but 
review here seems particularly intrusive.  The judges on the Federal 
Circuit have built up experience over their years of service, while the 
Justices of the Supreme Court do not even have a generalist’s 
knowledge of patent law.  After all, their own experience on lower 
court benches could not possibly have given them any perspective on 
patent law because—and there is some irony here—all the patent 
cases had been diverted to the Federal Circuit by the time most of 
them were appointed.  Justice Stevens is an exception, and he is 
approaching retirement.35 
On the one hand, Supreme Court involvement dilutes the Federal 
Circuit’s hard-won expertise, but on the other hand, the Supreme 
Court’s involvement may be more important in the case of the 
Federal Circuit than it is for the other courts it reviews.  Consider the 
common law.  Although patent law is nominally statutory, it leaves 
wide gaps for judge-made law.  And common law judges make law in 
an evolutionary and collaborative fashion. 
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Take the Evarts Act,36 which established the regional circuits.   
At the time the Act was passed, the question was whether these new 
regional circuits would be bound by each other’s law.  An approach 
requiring appellate courts to follow one another’s precedent would 
have had the benefit of guaranteed national uniformity.  
Nonetheless, the decision was made to give each circuit judicial 
independence—that is, to forego national uniformity—so that the 
law would “percolate,” allowing the fittest rule to survive.  “Survival of 
the fittest” is no longer possible for patent law, because apart from 
cases in the Holmes or Christianson posture, the only circuit court 
hearing patent cases is now the Federal Circuit. 
If, then, we are going to get evolution in patent law, it has to be 
through a different mechanism.  Supreme Court involvement in 
patent decisions is one such avenue.37  There is another reason 
Supreme Court involvement is necessary:  despite congressional 
attempts to give the Federal Circuit cases outside patent law, patents 
remain at the core of its docket, at least in the innovation area.  The 
court has little chance to see how patents fit into the economy as a 
whole.  The Supreme Court does have that perspective. 
And in the recent group of cases, we see the difference Supreme 
Court involvement can make at both the micro and the macro level.  
Thus, at the micro level the Supreme Court has made smallish 
doctrinal adjustments intended to keep patent law in the mainstream.  
In eBay, the Court claimed it was making sure that the standards for 
injunctive relief stay the same across all federal causes of action;38  
in MedImmune, it made the test for standing uniform;39 in Illinois Tool, 
it equalized the treatment of antitrust defendants.40 
At the macro level, the Supreme Court has, essentially, pressed the 
reset button.  Although I earlier described the establishment of the 
Federal Circuit as an outgrowth of administrative concerns, one can 
also read the legislative history as revealing a strong interest in 
strengthening patent value and stemming what was then perceived as 
                                                          
 36. Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). 
 37. See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”:  A Prescription for 
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 658 (2009). 
 38. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1577, 1579–80 (2006) (characterizing the rule that the Federal Circuit had 
applied as “unique to patent disputes”). 
 39. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1225, 1234 (2007) (holding that a patent licensee in good standing is not 
required to breach its license prior to challenging the validity of the underlying 
patent pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act). 
 40. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 46, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)  
1801, 1808 (2006) (holding that “in all cases involving a tying arrangement,  
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has market power in the tying product”). 
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a flight to trade secrecy.  The Federal Circuit took this commitment 
to heart (which, in part, may be why the patent bar has been so 
pleased with its performance).  However, its success has turned into 
something of a mixed blessing:  legal scholars, economists, the 
Federal Trade Commission, the National Academies, and even some 
in the patent industries have expressed concern that there are now 
too many patents, that they cover too much economic activity, that 
patent quality is declining, and that the high cost of patent litigation 
is chilling innovation.41 
The Supreme Court has moved in very effectively.  For example,  
by giving district courts discretion over awarding injunctive relief, 
eBay’s limit on permanent injunctive relief should reduce incentives 
to litigate;42 KSR, which raised the standard of nonobviousness, 
relieved concerns about patent quality; Justice Breyer’s dissent in 
LabCorp clearly flagged the problem of patent proliferation.  As he 
stated:  “[S]ometimes too much patent protection can impede rather 
than ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”43 
Of course, many of these changes could have been made by 
Congress, but as its recent prolonged attempt at patent reform 
suggests, there can be wisdom in relying on a judicial approach.44   
In sum, that is one problem:  figuring out how the Supreme Court 
can use the generalist knowledge derived from its unique position in 
a way that takes account of the Federal Circuit’s expertise in 
technology, patents, and licensing. 
The other problem is determining the Federal Circuit’s role as a 
specialist appellate court reviewing a generalist trial court.  The 
problem here is that appellate courts generally defer to the factual 
                                                          
 41. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:  
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH:  INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH (Stephen A. Merrill &  
Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2006); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  PROMOTING 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/ 
innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt074.pdf. 
 42. 547 U.S. at 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577. 
 43. Lab. Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126,  
79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1066 (2006) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 44. Reform bills include H.R. 5418, 109th Cong. (2006); the Patents Depend on 
Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong.; S. 3923, 109th Cong. (2006); and the 
Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong.  The 2007 proposals of the 110th 
Congress include S. 1145 and H.R. 1908.  Most recently, Congress is considering the 
Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong., and the Patent Reform Act of 
2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. 
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determinations made by trial courts.  In federal courts, deference is 
required by Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in 
the run-of-the-mill case, the Supreme Court’s steadfast enforcement 
of Rule 52 makes sense.  After all, the trial court is in a unique 
position regarding facts; the judge listens to the witnesses and learns 
about the documentary evidence as it is introduced.  But that 
comparative advantage is diminished in patent cases.  After all, most 
trial judges have very little experience in high-tech cases and some 
are very uncomfortable with technological complexity. 
But the Federal Circuit does not have that problem.  Besides,  
it chooses clerks for their technical backgrounds and it can hire staff 
to advise it on technical matters.  Accordingly, a strong argument can 
be made that the relationships between these courts should be 
different.  And significantly, the countries that have copied the idea 
of specialized patent courts have mostly established their patent 
courts at the trial court level, which is some indication that the real 
gains from specialization are reaped with respect to fact-finding.   
If that is true, it would be highly advantageous to find a way for the 
Federal Circuit to make an equivalent contribution, even though it is 
an appellate court. 
So, those are the two specialization issues—what can the courts 
learn from one another?  Although the Supreme Court is the older 
institution—and supreme—the fact of the matter is that the Federal 
Circuit faces these specialization issues more regularly.  As a result, it 
has the most to teach.  Starting at the end, with the question of trial 
court review:  since its earliest days, the Federal Circuit has been 
attentive to the question of effective review of fact-finding.  Likely, its 
concern initially arose because it was Chief Judge Markey’s view that 
the way to establish the court’s reputation would be to straighten out 
the mess that was nonobviousness, where the disparate views on the 
regional circuits had given rise to the most extremely corrosive form 
of forum shopping.  In its earliest nonobviousness cases, the Federal 
Circuit therefore undertook a detailed examination of the patents in 
issue, at the prior art, and at their relationship.  If it thought the trial 
court was wrong on nonobviousness, it reversed. 
What happened?  In Dennison Manufacturing Co. v. Panduit Corp.,45 
the Supreme Court held that Rule 52 permits appellate courts to 
reverse factual findings only when they are clearly erroneous, not 
                                                          
 45. 475 U.S. 809, 229 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 478 (1986) (per curiam). 
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merely wrong.46  And that Rule applied even though the Federal 
Circuit’s grasp of the facts was clearly better than the trial court’s. 
That was a major loss.  But the Federal Circuit did not give up on 
the enterprise both for nonobviousness and in general.  Instead,  
it adopted two other approaches.  First, it required the trial courts  
to apply specific analytical techniques to factual questions.   
For nonobviousness, for example, it required courts to examine 
secondary considerations—such things as commercial success and 
long-felt need.47  Furthermore, it required proof of a teaching, 
suggestion, or motivation for combining prior art.48  In addition, it 
started classifying many of the more complex technical issues as 
questions of law, rather than issues of fact, so that Rule 52 would not 
bar de novo review.49  The Federal Circuit has, in short, efficiently 
canvassed the ways in which it can bring its expertise to bear on the 
facts that affect the outcome of technologically complex cases.  
Admittedly, by requiring these analytical techniques, it has sacrificed 
flexibility for predictability.  But as we saw, improving predictability 
has very much pleased the patent industries. 
But there is a catch.  True, in Markman, the Supreme Court 
approved the idea of recharacterizing some factual questions as legal 
determinations.50  But at least in part, it did that because the move fit 
nicely with the Supreme Court’s own agenda about limiting fact-
finding by juries.51  In fact, the Supreme Court is busy dismantling the 
analytical requirements.  In KSR, its own case on nonobviousness, the 
Supreme Court began by “rejecting the rigid approach of the Court 
of Appeals.”52  And, many of the amicus briefs in Bilski ask the Court 
                                                          
 46. Id. at 811, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 749. 
 47. See, e.g., Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538, 218 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 871, 879 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that evidence of these “secondary 
considerations may often be the most probative and cogent evidence in the record”). 
 48. See, e.g., In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343–44, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430,  
1433–34 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 49. Cf. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970–71,  
34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that “the interpretation 
and construction of patent claims, which define the scope of the patentee’s rights 
under the patent, is a matter of law exclusively for the court”), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370,  
38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996). 
 50. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388–90, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1461, 1469–70 (1996) (holding that “there is sufficient reason to treat 
construction of terms of art like many other responsibilities that we cede to a judge 
in the normal course of trial, notwithstanding its evidentiary underpinnings,” which 
normally fall within the jury’s domain). 
 51. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1200 (1993) (giving the judge a role as gatekeeper of the evidence submitted to the 
jury). 
 52. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 
1395 (2007). 
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to similarly reject, as overly rigid, the Federal Circuit’s rules on 
determining patentable subject matter.53 
What the Supreme Court has not done, however, is face the larger 
question of expertise head-on.  If it does not like rigid rules, perhaps 
it should use its power under the Rules Enabling Act54 to change Rule 
52.  Or, if it does not want to engage in that particular experiment 
with Federal Circuit exceptionalism, it could help the Federal Circuit 
find the “sweet spot” between rigid rules and standards.  Either way, 
an acknowledgement of the Federal Circuit’s attempts to deal with 
deficiencies in lower courts’ handling of technologically complex 
factual issues could improve patent jurisprudence.  Taking lessons 
from the Federal Circuit might also help the Supreme Court improve 
adjudication of technical issues in other complex cases, such as 
antitrust and environmental law. 
What about the harder question, the one about the Federal 
Circuit’s relationship to the Supreme Court?  How do we get the 
benefits of Supreme Court intervention without sacrificing the 
advantages of relying on the Federal Circuit’s growing expertise?  
There are two sub-issues here:  When should the Supreme Court 
intervene—or more accurately, who should decide when the 
Supreme Court should decide?  And, does the Supreme Court owe 
the Federal Circuit any special regard on substantive patent law 
questions? 
On the first of these issues, I again think that the Supreme Court 
could learn a great deal from the Federal Circuit.  In the past, the 
Supreme Court has sometimes wasted its time.  An example is Pfaff v. 
Wells Electronics, Inc.,55 where the Court reached a perfectly reasonable 
position on when an invention was “on sale,”56 but the decision was 
no better than the one that the Federal Circuit would have found for 
itself.57  Since the Supreme Court’s resources are highly limited,  
                                                          
 53. Brief Amicus Curiae of Franklin Pierce Law Center in Support of Certiorari 
at 3, Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. filed Mar. 2, 2009), 2009 WL 2445759 
(claiming that Congress, the Supreme Court, and independent entities that have 
studied patent law “do not advocate limiting the scope of patentable subject 
matter”); Brief of Amicus Curiae Medistem Inc. in Support of the Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari at 6, Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. filed Feb. 27, 2009), 2009  
WL 564646 (“Narrowing the scope of patentable subject matter forces innovators to 
use other means of protecting their inventions, such as maintaining the invention as 
a trade secret.”); Brief of John P. Sutton Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3, 
Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. filed Feb. 25, 2009), 2009 WL 507782 (supporting 
certiorari to “clarify the law,” but not to “make commodity trading into patentable 
subject matter”). 
 54. Pub. L. No. 73-415, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934). 
 55. 525 U.S. 55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (1998). 
 56. Id. at 57, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642. 
 57. Janis, supra note 7, at 412. 
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it would be better for it to take the Federal Circuit’s advice on when a 
case is cert-worthy. 
To a certain extent, that is the way the Court appears to be 
operating.  Festo, Merck, and Bilski all featured sharp dissents in the 
Federal Circuit, and these opinions may have guided the Supreme 
Court’s decision to hear those cases.  I strongly believe that is the 
right approach:  to have the Federal Circuit signal the need for 
intervention.  But I would add two caveats.  First, if it is true that the 
Supreme Court is learning from the Federal Circuit, then the judges 
of the Federal Circuit need to be careful about what it is they teach.  
For example, while Supreme Court involvement on patentable 
subject matter might ultimately be useful, I would rather have waited 
to see how the new standard the Federal Circuit created in its 
decision in Bilski played out before the Supreme Court weighed in on 
whether the standard is correct.  Further, I would not give the 
Federal Circuit the only voice in choosing cases to review—the 
involvement of others (practitioners, the Solicitor General) will 
remain important.  As I noted earlier, the Federal Circuit is not  
well-positioned to think about how patents fit into the overall 
economy or to see when patent doctrine has deviated from general 
rules of law.  Accordingly, other voices are necessary on those issues. 
What the Supreme Court should do once it intervenes is another 
issue.  Is there reason to give some kind of deference to the Federal 
Circuit’s decisions on substantive law? 
The Supreme Court has certainly assumed that its role here is to be 
the teacher.  For example, it has severely criticized the Federal 
Circuit on departures from precedent:  KSR contained that message,58 
and Justice Breyer’s dissent in LabCorp was quite explicit.59  According 
to Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court “has never made such a 
statement [referring to the Federal Circuit’s rule in State Street Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.60 on the patentability of 
processes] and, if taken literally, the statement would cover instances 
where this Court has held the contrary.”61 
Nonetheless, it is hard to see how the Federal Circuit could define 
its job as merely applying Supreme Court precedent.  Technology 
                                                          
 58. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 
1395 (2007). 
 59. Lab. Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125, 
79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (2006) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 60. 149 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by  
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)  1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 61. LabCorp, 548 U.S. at 136, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
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changes rapidly.  Since the founding of the Federal Circuit, the 
biotech and IT industries exploded, the Internet was established, and 
patent exploitation became a global enterprise.  The entire structure 
of the patent industry changed as universities entered the picture, 
joint venturing became common, and new forms of patent 
aggregation were developed.  And yet, until KSR, the last case on 
nonobviousness was 1976; previous to LabCorp, the case on 
manipulating information was decided in 1981; until Microsoft, there 
were no Supreme Court cases on electronic distribution of patented 
materials; until Quanta Computer, there was nothing on modern  
value-chain licensing. 
John Duffy has written about how, even with limited engagement, 
the Supreme Court can adequately supervise the Federal Circuit.62  
And I have just said that on micro and macro issues, the Supreme 
Court ought to be the teacher.  But should its views always trump?   
I would argue that the Supreme Court’s testiness about the Federal 
Circuit’s departures from its precedents is often inappropriate, and 
that it adversely affects Supreme Court litigation as well.  Litigants are 
forced to rely on language from ancient case law that no one wants to 
resurrect, when they should be suggesting formulations that address 
contemporary problems.  A good example is the concept of 
“synergy.”63 
In certain respects, then, the Supreme Court ought to 
conceptualize its relationship with the Federal Circuit as more of a 
dialogue than the product of hierarchy—as I said earlier—as the 
substitute for percolation.  The mechanism for doing that is certainly 
there.  Consider patentable subject matter:  first, there was—in 
Justice Breyer’s words—the Federal Circuit’s “statement” about 
patentability in State Street.  Then came Justice Breyer’s dissent in 
LabCorp.  That spurred a set of Federal Circuit cases, culminating in 
Bilski, which the Supreme Court then decided to review.  Next came 
Prometheus Laboratory, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Service,64 another 
subject matter case, and Prometheus will, of course, be followed by the 
Supreme Court decision in Bilski.  So, there is plenty of opportunity 
for a really good interchange of ideas, and the Supreme Court seems 
                                                          
 62. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the 
Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 298–99 (2002). 
 63. See Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 808 n.96 (“A good example is [KSR], where the 
Federal Circuit’s nonobviousness jurisprudence was said to conflict with [Black Rock], 
and [Sakraida].  However, those cases announced a ‘synergy’ requirement for 
combination patents which has long been considered unworkable.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 64. 581 F.3d 1336, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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receptive to that approach.  Indeed, even when the Supreme Court 
reverses the Federal Circuit’s decisions, the Court rather significantly 
leaves implementation questions to the Federal Circuit’s discretion. 
One could also think about this institutionally.  Is the Supreme 
Court the best institution to be setting mid-range policy, by which  
I mean crafting the policies relevant to the administration of patent 
law?  In other technical areas, there is an administrative agency that 
fulfills that function.  Now, I have left the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) out of this discussion because it was founded before 
the Administrative Procedure Act; lacks rule-making authority; and 
only sees the issues that arise when a patent is issued, not the ones 
that come up when patented information is used.65  Perhaps things 
will change under the new Commissioner, David Kappos, but as 
currently constituted, the PTO just cannot play the institutional role  
I am discussing.66  And as we have seen, Congress is not in a position 
to do much on this either.  So, we have a technically complex set of 
problems, key to our economic health, and something of a vacuum 
on the institutional end.  Now that all patent cases are before the 
Federal Circuit, it is uniquely positioned to take on the job of filling 
that void.  But for that to happen, the Federal Circuit has to act like a 
teacher:  it has to explain what policies it is adopting. 
This, indeed, is a place where the Federal Circuit could learn from 
the Supreme Court:  not what the mid-level policy ought to be— 
I would leave that to the Federal Circuit—but how to make it evident 
what mid-level policies it has chosen and why it has decided to further 
them.  In other words, the Federal Circuit must articulate the theory 
on which it is relying. 
The Supreme Court works very hard to explain what it does.   
It often describes the alternative ways in which it could decide a case, 
it identifies the policy choices associated with each alternative, and it 
explains the theory behind the choice it is making.  In part, that may 
be an outgrowth of confronting circuit court splits—it must explain 
to each circuit why it chose the rule that it did—but it is even true of 
                                                          
 65. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1930, 1933 
(1999) (examining the Federal Circuit’s review of the USPTO’s fact-finding 
authority); see also Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA?  What 
The Patent System Can Learn From Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 285–87 (2007); 
Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
907, 910–13 (2004); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy:  A Multi-Institutional 
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1052 (2003). 
 66. See generally Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1972–83 (2009) (providing an overview of the PTO’s efforts 
to expand its authority in terms of agency status, judicial deference, and rulemaking 
authority). 
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the Supreme Court’s patent jurisprudence.  For example, KSR laid 
out the reasons why the nonobviousness standard needed to be 
elevated,67 Festo provided justification for retaining the doctrine of 
equivalents,68 and in LabCorp, Justice Breyer made his views 
exceptionally clear:  “[S]ometimes too much patent protection can 
impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.’”69 
In contrast, although the Federal Circuit routinely recites policy 
justifications for the statutory requirements of patent law, it rarely 
provides insight into the policy rationale for its own decisions.  
Indeed, some of the judges have publicly suggested that it would be 
wrong to explain (or even to be motivated by) policy.70  Now, I have 
written elsewhere that the reason for denying policy motives may 
have something to do with the experimental nature of the court.  
Perhaps it did not want to make waves while it was “on probation” in 
the public’s mind.71  But after more than twenty-five years, I think it is 
safe to say that the experiment is over.  The court is now part of the 
fabric of the U.S. judiciary. 
Unless the Federal Circuit does a good job articulating, explaining, 
and justifying policy, it cannot play the institutional role I envision.  
For example, I just mentioned the potential dialogue on patentable 
subject matter.  But there is a small flaw in the argument:  when the 
Federal Circuit decided Prometheus, it never engaged Breyer’s dissent 
in LabCorp—even though both of the cases were about the same type 
of invention.72  Instead, in a footnote, the Federal Circuit dismissed 
LabCorp, stating that a “dissent is not controlling law” and that the 
claims in the two cases were “different,” but offered no policy-based 
explanation as to how they were different enough to mandate different 
                                                          
 67. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 
1396–97 (2007). 
 68. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732–35, 
62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1709–11 (2002). 
 69. Lab. Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126, 
79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1066 (2006) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 70. See, e.g., Alan D. Lourie, A View from the Court, 75 PATENT, TRADEMARK & 
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 22 (2007) (“[N]ot once have we had a discussion as to what 
direction the law should take. . . . We have just applied precedent as best we could 
determine it to the cases that have come before us.”); Paul Michel, Judicial 
Constellations:  Guiding Principles as Navigational Aids, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 758 
(2004). 
 71. Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 814–27. 
 72. Compare Prometheus Lab., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Serv., 581 F.3d 1336, 1339, 
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1075, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (involving a patent claiming 
methods for diagnosing responsiveness to a particular treatment), with LabCorp, 548 
U.S. at 125, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066 (involving a patent claiming a method for 
diagnosing certain vitamin deficiencies). 
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results.73  This is true for other issues as well:  Had the Federal Circuit 
explained why it was ignoring Rule 52 in Panduit, or why it was 
adopting analytical rules, perhaps the Supreme Court might have 
taken the problematic nature of its relationship to the trial courts 
more seriously. 
I hasten to add that, to an extent, the Federal Circuit is learning 
this lesson.  An example is the Federal Circuit’s decision in Bilski, 
which very deliberately and repeatedly referenced Diamond v. Diehr, 
the Supreme Court’s 1981 decision on the patentability of software.74  
That approach neatly teed up the problem of relying on outdated 
case law.  We will have to see whether the Federal Circuit made the 
issue of its authority as a specialized court to stray from Supreme 
Court precedents clear enough for the Supreme Court to consider 
the problem. 
The opinion-writing issue allows me to segue into another area 
where the courts have a great deal to teach each other, and that is on 
dealing with the special problems that come from being a court of 
last resort, with supervisory and administrative responsibilities.  Once 
again, I think the Federal Circuit has something important to teach.  
The lesson goes back to the question of reviewing district court  
fact-finding.  While I am also somewhat skeptical about over-reliance 
on rigid rules, the Federal Circuit deserves credit for taking its role in 
supervising the lower courts seriously.  That is what made the court 
such a success in patent law circles, and there is a lesson there for the 
Supreme Court.  As two of my colleagues, Sam Estreicher and John 
Sexton noted twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court’s own docket 
is cluttered with cases that arise directly from that Court’s failure to 
provide clear analytical directions.75  Now that the Supreme Court is 
taking fewer cases, that failure may become even more serious.  Here, 
the Federal Circuit’s responsiveness could act as a template for the 
Court. 
                                                          
 73. Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1346 n.3, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085. 
 74. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 952, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (en banc) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 39 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 
(1981)), cert. granted sub nom., Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), and argued sub 
nom., Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. argued Nov. 9, 2009). 
 75. See Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme 
Court’s Responsibilities:  An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 812 (1984) (“In our 
view, the Court should act as the manager of the federal judicial system, overseeing 
the work of the federal and state courts, and intervening only when necessary to 
resolve fundamental interbranch or federal-state clashes or to render a final 
resolution of a question that has ripened for decision after percolation in the lower 
courts.”). 
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In other respects, however, this is a place where the Supreme Court 
has more experience, and so the Federal Circuit has much to learn.  
First, there is the issue of writing informative opinions.  One reason 
to think of the Federal Circuit as filling an institutional vacuum is 
because it is a court of last resort.  As I tell my students, for patent 
law, the Federal Circuit usually is the Supreme Court.  But if it is, it 
has to act that way.  It cannot play a policy role unless it tells us what 
the policy is.  Well-articulated policy is also important for supervising 
the lower courts.  Indeed, it is a tool that might replace at least some 
of the Federal Circuit’s famous rigidity.76  That is, the better the trial 
court understands the policy that the Federal Circuit is trying to 
achieve, the more likely it will do what the Federal Circuit thinks is 
required. 
A change might also help to clear the court’s dockets.  Federal 
Circuit judges have complained about appeals that are built around 
nothing more than minor changes in the wording of its holdings.  
But if the litigants better understood the underlying policy, these 
linguistic variations might seem less salient to them. 
Another issue concerns what I call the repeat player disadvantage.  
A problem for courts of last resort, or for a court that has an 
institutional role in setting policy, is that the law it hands down can 
require revision.  Justice Brennan used to call this “damage control.”  
A new rule could be wrong, it might be confusingly formulated, or it 
may wind up applying to situations the court did not foresee.  To do 
damage control, the court must take the issue up again.  And therein 
lies the problem:  litigants have to persuade the court to reconsider 
an issue it has already laid to rest, and that is not always comfortable.  
Repeat players—attorneys who appear before a court regularly—may 
not want to annoy the judges and jeopardize their credibility in 
future cases.77  So, for example, John Duffy and Craig Nard note that 
the number of PTO certiorari petitions plummeted after the Federal 
Circuit was established.78  As the quintessential repeat player, perhaps 
it has been trying to avoid that kind of friction. 
Other litigators may also be facing this issue.  It seems to me that 
one such example is the common law experimental use defense.   
In Madey v. Duke University,79 the Federal Circuit seemingly reduced 
                                                          
 76. See Dreyfuss supra note 9, at 803 (“The elaboration of policy would make the 
law more comprehensible, and thus easier to apply reproducibly.”). 
 77. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting:  The  PTO as Cause or 
Cure, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1559, 1570 (2006). 
 78. See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity 
Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1641 n.79 (2007). 
 79. 307 F.3d 1351, 1362, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1746 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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the defense quite radically and that has caused a great deal of 
consternation in the research community.  The court could have 
done damage control in Merck, which also involved 
experimentation,80 and in fact, Judge Newman tried to limit Madey in 
her separate opinion in that case.81  But the attorneys in Merck chose 
to avoid the Madey issue and relied instead on a statutory defense.82  
They won, so they did right by their clients—but their decision has 
left the scope of the common law exception in doubt for more than 
half a decade. 
How can courts of last resort avoid the repeat player disadvantage?  
The Supreme Court does it first by recognizing the problem, and 
second, by dropping footnotes about issues that need 
reconsideration, by writing dissents, or by granting certiorari on a 
case raising a problematic issue and then dismissing the case.  These 
actions serve as invitations:  they empower otherwise reluctant lawyers 
to find a good case to bring back an issue for reconsideration in a 
nice clean case.  It is a useful technique, and we do see a few Federal 
Circuit dissents along those lines.  For example, the en banc 
reconsideration of the written description requirement in Ariad 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co.83 owed much to the persistent 
opinion writing by Judges Rader and Linn; 84 their dissents to the en 
banc decision may also lead to Supreme Court consideration of the 
issue.85  But more could be done to make these invitations clear.   
Or, perhaps, what is needed is something different:  the Federal 
Circuit bar needs to learn a lesson from the Supreme Court bar on 
how to read these tea leaves and act on them. 
                                                          
 80. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated, 545 U.S. 193, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 
(2005). 
 81. Id. at 877–78, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877 (Newman, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (differentiating “research into the science and technology 
disclosed in patents” from research tools, which are “product[s] or method[s] whose 
purpose is use in the conduct of research”). 
 82. Id. at 864, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867 (majority opinion). 
 83. 560 F.3d 1366, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1549 (Fed. Cir. 2009), rev’d in part and 
aff’d in part en banc, No. 2008-1248, 2010 WL 1007369 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 22, 2010). 
 84. See, e.g., id. at 1380, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559 (Linn, J., concurring); 
LizardTech, Inc. v. Univ. of Cal., 433 F.3d 1373, 1376, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1391, 
1392 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc);  
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 1303, 1307, 1325,   
71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1548, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, J., and Linn, J., 
separately dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.  
Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Linn, J., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc). 
 85. Ariad Pharms. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 2008-1248, 2010 WL 1007369, at *22, 28 
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 22, 2010) (en banc) (Rader, J., and Linn, J., separately dissenting in 
part and concurring in part). 
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To sum up, the Supreme Court’s recent interest in patent law is 
highly intriguing.  It has caused consternation in patent circles.   
But it should not.  There are many questions that these courts need 
to work through jointly:  questions on when specialization is 
necessary, how it should be provided, under what circumstances a 
specialized court should be able to “pull rank” and claim that its 
expertise gives it a superior perspective.  By teaching each other the 
lessons that come from their unique perspectives, these two courts 
can bring the Hruska Commission’s experiment to fruition and make 
a truly significant contribution to judicial administration both here in 
the United States and abroad.  Equally important, the Federal Circuit 
and the Supreme Court can together update patent law to the 
emerging needs of the “Knowledge Economy.”  As a student of both 
patent law and institutional design, it is a pleasure to watch these 
cases and this dialogue unfold.  Thank you again for giving me the 
opportunity to talk about one of my favorite subjects. 
